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Knowledge and Communication 
in Democratic Politics: Markets, 
Forums and Systems
Jonathan Benson
Abstract
Epistemic questions have become an important area of debate within democratic theory. Epistemic 
democrats have revived epistemic justification of democracy, while social scientific research has 
speared a significant debate on voter knowledge. An area which has received less attention, 
however, is the epistemic case for markets. Market advocates have developed a number of 
epistemic critiques of democracy which suggest that most goods are better provided by markets 
than democratic institutions. Despite representing important challenges to democracy, these 
critiques have gone without reply as democratic theorists have tended to exclude markets from 
consideration. This article responds to these critiques and argues that there are good epistemic 
grounds for granting a much greater role to democracy than its market critics have claimed. It 
argues that there is a broad range of goods, including important ethical goods, which are better 
provided by democracy than markets due to the particular epistemic burdens they create.
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Epistemic questions have become an important area of debate within the theory and prac-
tice of democracy. Democratic theory, which often focuses on the intrinsic or procedural 
value of democracy, has seen a revival of epistemic justification which focuses on the 
ways that democratic procedures, such as vote aggregation and deliberation, communi-
cate and aggregate knowledge. Epistemic democrats, for instance, have placed such 
issues at the centre of democracies’ legitimacy and have developed innovative new argu-
ments for the epistemic abilities of democracy (Anderson, 2006; Estlund, 2008; 
Landemore, 2013). Social scientific research on voter ignorance has also speared a sig-
nificant debate on the extent to which citizens can make effective decisions when voting. 
Some within this debate take these studies to be damaging enough to require restriction 
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of voting rights to the more knowledgeable, while others defend the ability of voters to 
overcome their limited knowledge through the use of various shortcuts or heuristics 
(Brennan, 2016; Caplan, 2007).
An epistemic area which has received much less attention from democratic theory is 
the epistemic case for markets. Market advocates have put forward a number of epistemic 
critiques of democracy which suggest that most goods are better provided by the market 
than any democratic institution. Hayekians, for instance, have argued that democratic 
institutions, such as assemblies and parliaments, require knowledge to be centralised to a 
democratic forum and will, therefore, fail to utilise knowledge which is local, dispersed 
and fragmented (Pennington, 2003, 2011). Samuel DeCanio (2014) has further argued 
that the singular nature of democratic decisions forces decision-makers to make accurate 
policy predictions which require large amounts of knowledge. In contrast, markets coor-
dinate individuals and goods through price signals, while allowing multiple firms to 
implement alternatives simultaneously so consumers can compare their outcomes with-
out predictive knowledge. Markets, therefore, reduce the epistemic burden facing deci-
sion-makers relative to democracy. Wherever markets are possible, it is argued that there 
are good epistemic grounds to prefer them to democratic institutions. This epistemic case 
for markets over democracy has received particular attention in environmental debates 
(Benson, 2018; Cordato, 2004; Greenwood, 2012, 2015; O’Neill, 2012; Pennington, 
2001, 2005, 2011; Sagoff, 2008; Shahar, 2017). Much of environmental politics is highly 
sceptical of markets and instead tends to favour democratic institutions for the achieve-
ment of environmental values. Environmental democracy, however, has been argued to 
face significant epistemic challenges in attempting to gather and utilise the knowledge 
required to manage and coordinate environmental goods. Alternatively, a system of prop-
erty rights and price signals can coordinate individuals as they act on their own local 
knowledge, without the need to centralise information to some democratic authority.
This epistemic challenge to democracy has yet to be addressed as many democratic 
theorists concerned with epistemic questions have tended to exclude markets from con-
sideration. This article engages with these critiques and argues that there are good epis-
temic grounds for giving a much greater role to democratic institutions than their 
pro-market critics have claimed. It will develop the concept of low feedback goods, and 
argue that they represent a broad range of goods which cannot be accounted for by the 
pro-market arguments. These goods are disconnected from the individuals who pursue 
them and do not, therefore, provide market actors with the feedback information they 
require. As a result, individuals will face significant burdens for explicit knowledge 
which markets are unable to deal with. Low feedback goods include many environmental 
goods but also others, such as health, human rights resource distributions and fair labour 
practices. It will then be argued that democratic institutions, conceived in deliberative 
terms, have a number of important epistemic advantages which make them better place to 
deal with these goods than markets.
The Market Critique of Democracy
This section will lay out two epistemic critiques of democracy made by market advocates 
and will use the example of environmental goods to demonstrate their significance. 
Democratic decision-making can take a number of different forms, but the focus here will 
be on democratic decisions as found in democratic forums, such as representative parlia-
ments and citizens assemblies. Although some of the arguments considered also affect 
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electoral decisions taken by voters, this will not be the focus. A significant number of 
democratic decisions are taken within forums, and they play a central role in much demo-
cratic theory, particularly deliberative democracy (Smith, 2009). Such forums will also be 
critical to the reply to market critiques developed later.
The first epistemic critique draws on Friedrich Hayek’s analysis of the division of 
knowledge in society. This argument is based on a distinction Hayek (1948, 2011) made 
between two forms of knowledge. The first form is general knowledge, which is defined 
as abstract or formal knowledge, such as scientific knowledge. The second is local knowl-
edge about the particular circumstances of time and place. The important thing in this 
distinction is that while general scientific knowledge can be known to some group of 
relevant experts, local knowledge does not exist in any coherent whole but is rather spread 
throughout society. It includes such things as knowledge of the conditions of resources, 
as well as preferences for and uses of different goods. Such knowledge is not known to 
any group of experts but is rather dispersed in the minds of those on-the-spot individuals 
who have direct experiences of local conditions.
Contemporary Hayekians, notably Mark Pennington (2003, 2011), have argued that 
this division of knowledge creates important epistemic problems for democratic forms of 
decision-making. Democratic institutions, such as representative parliaments or citizens’ 
assemblies, take decisions within forums. They, therefore, require that all relevant knowl-
edge, necessary for making effective decisions, be centralised in those forums so that it 
can contribute to democratic decisions. The division of knowledge, however, is argued to 
frustrate this task. The information relevant to addressing social problems includes a large 
body of local knowledge, which does not exist in any coherent whole ready to be utilised 
by democratic decision-makers. Instead, such knowledge is only known to particular 
individuals spread throughout society and is, therefore, fragmented and dispersed. 
Democratic institutions, however, require that dispersed knowledge be centralised in a 
democratic forum. Even if democratic institutions take place at the local level, as opposed 
to the state or national level, knowledge which is only known to on-the-spot individuals 
must still be transmitted to its decision procedures. Decentralising democratic institutions 
can help to reduce the problem of the division of knowledge, by reducing the amount of 
local knowledge and bringing decisions closer to individuals. However, it does not solve 
it as dispersed information must still be communicated to a forum.
For Hayekians, the division of knowledge is not solved by ‘first communicating all 
this knowledge to a central board’ but rather through a greater ‘form of decentralization’ 
(Hayek, 1948: 84). Markets decentralise decision-making to the level of the individual. 
This allows individual market actors to make decisions on their own local knowledge 
without the need to centralise knowledge. Their individual actions are then coordinated 
through the price mechanism which spreads their information throughout the economy. 
Through acts of buying and selling, individuals influence the formation of market prices 
which then allows others to adjust their actions. If, for instance, the actions of many indi-
viduals change the demand or supply of tin, then this will be reflected in its price (Hayek, 
1948). This price change then communicates to market actors that they should consume 
more or less of the good. Prices do not communicate the reasons behind any changes but 
rather allow individuals to adjust their use of goods as if they possessed such information. 
The market, therefore, allows individuals to act on their own local knowledge and be 
coordinated by the communicative capacity of the price mechanism. People’s uses and 
preferences for goods are therefore coordinated without any need to first communicate all 
knowledge to any decision procedure, such as a democratic forum.
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DeCanio (2014) has added to this case for markets over democracy with a second 
epistemic argument.1 In order to compare alternative policies or plans in a democratic 
forum, decision-makers are required to make predictions about their relative outcomes. 
Due to the singular and exclusive nature of such democratic decisions, only one option 
can be chosen and implemented at any one time. Predictions are, therefore, needed to 
choose between alternatives. Predictions, however, require a large amount of knowledge 
about the causal relationships between rival policies and the relevant outcomes. For 
example, if a democratic institution aims to provide a more fuel-efficient or comfortable 
car, it will need to make predictions about how alternative car designs will impact on this 
criterion. This will require a large amount of information about the causal mechanisms. 
For instance, about whether making a car out of lighter materials contributes more or less 
to fuel efficiency than changing the engine design.
Markets, however, reduce the need for predictive knowledge. In markets, multiple 
firms can implement alternative plans simultaneously so that individual consumers are 
able to make comparisons of outcomes without the need for predictions. In the case of car 
designs, for example, multiple firms produce a number of different designs simultane-
ously. Consumers can then make side-by-side comparisons of their relative comfort or 
fuel efficiency without needing to be aware of the reason for their different performance. 
They do not need to be aware how causal relationships produce different outcomes as 
they have access to the outcomes themselves. Again decentralisation can help democratic 
institutions but cannot solve the problem completely. Having multiple local forums 
increases the number of policies which can be implemented at one time. However, the 
singular and exclusive nature of these local forums still means multiple plans cannot be 
implemented in the same area or jurisdiction, while the number of decision points, and 
therefore the number of plans, is still reduced compared to markets.2
Together, these arguments make a strong epistemic case for markets over democracy. 
Their significance can be seen by considering environmental goods where the epistemic 
case for markets has received much attention (Benson, 2018; Cordato, 2004; Greenwood, 
2012, 2015; O’Neill, 2012; Pennington, 2001, 2005, 2011; Sagoff, 2008; Shahar, 2017). 
Environmental goods can be broadly defined as those natural or ecosystem goods and ser-
vices, which people value through experience, use or consumption (Díaz et al., 2015). This 
definition is broad as it does not restrict a good’s value to its contributions to human welfare 
and it includes any goods or services which are produced by natural systems. These include 
forests, wetlands, mountains, air, biodiversity and the primary resources which can be 
exploited from ecosystems. Much political theory and economy is highly sceptical of mar-
kets when it comes to environmental goods (Barry, 1999; Benson, 2018; Greenwood, 2007; 
O’Neill, 2017; Zografos and Howarth, 2010). Markets are associated not only with perva-
sive externality problems but also with a preoccupation with economic and instrumental 
values. Environmental goods are seen to involve a diversity of values which include not just 
contributions to human welfare but also relational and intrinsic values (Díaz et al., 2015; 
O’Neill, 2017; Pascual et al., 2017). They do not include merely personal goods which 
contribute to an individual’s own welfare but also ethical goods which are the subject of 
people’s wider ethical, moral and justice-based values. Democratic institutions, rather than 
markets, are seen to be necessary for expressing and achieving these diverse and possibly 
incommensurable environmental values. This can be seen in the emergence of deliberative 
and participatory approaches to environmental decision-making (Meadowcroft, 2004). 
Although not the only form of environmental democracy, deliberative forums such as citi-
zens’ assemblies and juries, mini-publics, roundtables and deliberative forms of valuation 
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have received significant support in both the theory and practice of environmental politics. 
These democratic forums are seen to be best placed to express environmental values while 
bringing individuals into contact with new forms of knowledge, both scientific and local 
(Díaz et al., 2015; Fazey et al., 2005).
The epistemic arguments considered here, however, suggest a much greater role for 
markets in the provision of environmental goods (Pennington, 2001, 2005, 2011). From a 
Hayekian perspective, the knowledge required to make decisions about environmental 
goods is dispersed throughout society. Knowledge of the conditions of particular environ-
mental goods, local management regimes and individual preferences and values for envi-
ronmental goods is only known to certain on-the-spot individuals who have direct 
experience of local conditions. The democratic forums favoured by environmental poli-
tics would, therefore, have to gather all this dispersed knowledge to its decision procedure 
in order to make effective decisions. Its requirements for knowledge will be further exac-
erbated by the need for policy predictions. Making predictions about the outcomes of 
alternative environmental policies or management practices requires being aware of the 
causal relationships between a chosen policy and the environment. The relationships 
between human actions and the natural world, however, are highly complex and require a 
large amount of both scientific and local knowledge in order to be properly understood.
Alternatively, markets have been argued to overcome these challenges through the 
communicative capacity of price signals and the possibility of comparisons of outcomes. 
If this is the case, then it ‘follows that the most appropriate way to communicate environ-
mental information would be to allow the development of markets in environmental 
goods’ (Pennington, 2001: 183). By establishing property rights and markets in environ-
mental goods, individuals can pursue their diverse environmental values and preferences 
without the need to centralise information, as price signals will coordinate their varied 
ends (Hayek, 2013). Consider a conflict between the recreational value of ski resorts and 
the environmental value of unspoiled mountain ranges within which they are built. In a 
system of free-markets, prices will respond to changes in demand for the two goods. The 
development of ski resorts will, therefore, be shifted away from those more environmen-
tally valued and therefore more expensive sites, to those less environmental valued and 
therefore less expensive sites (Pennington, 2005). The different environmental values and 
preferences of individuals are therefore coordinated through price signals and reflected in 
the emergent outcomes of market interaction. By not reserving the management of envi-
ronmental goods to the exclusive control of a democratic institution, markets also allow 
alternative approaches to be implemented simultaneously. The need for large amounts of 
predictive knowledge is therefore decreased as individual market actors are able to 
observe the outcomes produced by alternative providers of environmental goods.
Advocates of environmental markets recognise problems, such as climate change, 
where property rights and markets cannot be established, and alternatives are required. 
However, where markets and property rights are possible, they argue that there are sig-
nificant epistemic benefits to environmental markets over democratic institutions. This 
example of environmental goods, therefore, helps demonstrate the implications of the 
epistemic case for markers over democracy, even in an area where markets are often met 
with considerable scepticism.
One place we might start to look for a reply to these arguments is in the work of epis-
temic democrats, who have argued for the superior problem-solving abilities of demo-
cratic decision-making. Epistemic democrats, however, have tended to remove markets 
from their analysis. Hélène Landemore (2013: 86), for instance, states that ‘the market is 
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not a political decision procedure’ and therefore ‘does not offer an alternative’ to democ-
racy. She then restricts her arguments to other forms of decision-making such as autoc-
racy and aristocracy. Similarly, Elizabeth Anderson (2006: 9) constrains her analysis to 
problems of ‘public interest’ which are said to exclude consideration of markets which are 
confined to private matters. Despite epistemic democrats’ tendencies to exclude markets, 
the market critiques directly challenge democracy on epistemic grounds. For example, 
Landemore argues that democratic deliberation can draw on the benefits of cognitive 
diversity in order to more effectively solve social problems than less exclusive processes, 
such as aristocracy. Even if deliberation has this ability, however, the arguments of market 
advocates suggest that it will be unable to gather the dispersed knowledge relevant to 
addressing social problems and will require decision-makers to make information inten-
sive predictions. So although democratic deliberation may outperform other collective 
forms of decision-making, it will be less effective than a decentralised market which can 
utilise dispersed knowledge and allow for comparisons of outcomes. New epistemic argu-
ments are, therefore, required in order to address the pro-market critiques.
The rest of this article will argue that there are good epistemic grounds for giving a 
much greater role to democratic institutions than their market critics have suggested. 
First, however, a caveat is required about the scope of the article. Although the critiques 
discussed have been aimed at democratic institutions, they do not attack their intrinsically 
democratic features. They focus not on their inclusive nature but rather on their collective 
and singular characteristics. As a result, an assembly or board of technocrats or adminis-
trators would suffer from the same problems. This article, however, will focus on democ-
racy and markets, and will not consider other alternatives. It will aim to defend democracy 
against the arguments of market advocates without directly engaging with other institu-
tional designs which may or may not face similar challenges. These alternatives have, 
however, been discussed elsewhere by other democratic theorists in epistemic terms (see 
Anderson, 2006; Estlund, 2008; Landemore, 2013). The rest of the article will therefore 
remain internal to the debate between democracy and the market.
The Epistemic Limits of Markets
In the previous section, we saw two epistemic critiques of democracy which argued that, 
wherever they are possible, markets should be preferred to democratic institutions. 
Democratic control should be reserved only for areas where markets and property rights 
cannot be established. An immediate objection to these claims is that inequalities in mar-
kets create inequalities in the ability to communicate through acts of buying and selling. 
Not all individuals have the capacity to communicate their knowledge in markets, and 
their knowledge will likely be lost (O’Neill, 1998). This will not, however, be the argu-
ment pursued in this article. The reason for this is not to dismiss the importance of ine-
qualities, but rather to identify a deeper problem with market mechanisms and the 
epistemic arguments for them. This problem is deeper in the sense that it exists even if 
there was complete equality between market actors.3
What is central to the pro-market arguments is that markets reduce the need for explicit 
knowledge. Explicit knowledge is knowledge which needs to be consciously known to 
decision-makers. It is general or local knowledge which decision-makers must be explic-
itly aware of in order to make decisions. Markets are argued to reduce the need for explicit 
knowledge by allowing individuals to pursue their preferences and values for goods with-
out centralising large amounts of knowledge, and by allowing comparisons of outcomes. 
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This and the following section will argue that there is a class of goods, where the 
pro-market arguments fail. It will develop the concept of low feedback goods and argue 
that individual market actors will face large burdens for explicit knowledge when it comes 
to these good, burdens which cannot be met by market communication.
First, we need to see how the epistemic case for markets requires the presence of feed-
back signals to provide market actors with certain basic information. Consider the out-
come comparisons highlighted by DeCanio. An individual can only make such 
comparisons if they receive feedback information about the outcomes of different alterna-
tives. By testing different cars, a consumer will receive clear feedback allowing them to 
determine which is the most comfortable. It is this feedback about their relative comfort 
which reduces the consumers’ need for explicit knowledge. Similarly, market actors can 
only act on their preferences and values for goods, if they know the extent to which their 
decisions achieve these goods and, therefore, satisfy these preferences and values. An 
individual with a preference for spicy food, for instance, can buy different food products 
and receive clear feedback about the extent to which they satisfy this preference.
As should be clear from these examples, feedback information will be available for 
many goods. There is, however, a class of goods which will not involve the clear feedback 
information required by markets. We can call these goods low feedback goods. Their 
defining feature is that they are in some way separated or disconnected from individuals 
who value them. They may, for instance, be separated in terms of time or space. The result 
of this disconnection is that individuals will not be provided with direct feedback infor-
mation about the effect of their decisions and the extent to which they achieve the good 
they pursue. Take, for instance, individuals pursuing the good of personal health. Often, 
although by no means always, individuals will not receive feedback information about 
how their market decisions affect their health. Take the decision of which supplier of 
water to choose. Many of the health effects which may result from pollutants or chemicals 
in different supplies of water will not be easily recognisable by consumers. They may, for 
instance, take long periods of time to take effect or may only increase an individual risk 
of contracting a health problem.4 These factors create a disconnection between the indi-
vidual and good they pursue. It will, therefore, be very difficult for individuals to tell 
what, if any, affect a certain supply of water has on their health. In the absence of this 
feedback information, market actors will require explicit knowledge in order to make 
decisions. They will, for instance, need to be aware of all the pollutants and chemical 
contents of different supplies of water, and of the different health effects these substances 
can have, and in what quantities. This is a large epistemic burden which further increases 
when we consider that individual will require knowledge relating to all their other market 
decisions which could impact their health in similar ways.
At this point, it may be thought that low feedback goods are only a small category of 
goods. That there are only rare examples, such as health, where individuals do not receive 
direct feedback signals. However, the greater significance of this problem can be seen 
when we consider ethical goods. Ethical goods are defined as goods which relate not to 
an individual’s own welfare, such as the personal good of health, but to such things as the 
welfare of others or the relations between them. They are not the subject of self-interested 
preferences but rather an individual’s wider ethical, moral, or justice-based values. The 
fact that ethical goods do not relate directly to an individual’s own welfare means they 
will necessarily be separated from individuals and, therefore, likely to be low feedback 
goods. This is not to say that all ethical goods are low feedback goods. If I care about the 
welfare of individuals very close to me, then I may receive feedback about the effect of 
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my actions on their well-being. In a large society, however, there will be many ethical 
goods which people value from which they are greatly separated.5
The example of environmental goods, which are often valued on ethical grounds, can 
help to illustrate the problem facing markets. Consider market actors who value the 
Amazon rainforest as an ethical good. They may, for instance, believe that it is complex 
and unique biodiversity to be of particular value. Now those who live or work within the 
Amazon may receive feedback information about their impact on it. They may receive 
signals about the way this ecosystem is changing. However, those who value the Amazon 
as an ethical good are not confined to these individuals but include many people who are 
significantly disconnected from it. You do not need to be in close proximity to the Amazon 
to value its biodiversity or to have an impact on its condition. You could, for example, be 
in another country entirely. There is, therefore, no set or given list of low feedback goods 
as they are in a particular respect agent-relative. Something can be a low feedback good 
to some people but not to others depending on their position. The Amazon may not be a 
low feedback good to those who live and work within it while being a low feedback good 
to others who are more distant. Through the products these distant individuals buy and 
sell, they can still have significant effects on the Amazon but receive no feedback infor-
mation about their effects due to this separation. Market actors may be provided with 
information about good such as the comfortableness of cars or the taste of food, as these 
goods are closely connected to the individual who values them. For an ethical good, such 
as the Amazon, however, there can be significant separation between the good and many 
individuals who value it, resulting in a lack of feedback signals. In order to pursue the 
good they value, market actors will, therefore, require large amounts of explicit knowl-
edge. They will need to be consciously aware of the relationship between their market 
decision and the ethical good they value. This relationship, however, can be highly com-
plex and involve a large amount of general and local knowledge. It includes knowledge 
of the production and consumption of all the different products they buy and sell, the 
kinds of waste they produce and the different effects this can have on environmental 
goods.
Low feedback goods then produce large burdens for explicit knowledge and will be 
particularly prevalent when it comes to ethical goods. It is important to see that this 
problem is distinct from the externalities problem. Even if the whole of the Amazon 
rainforest was privately owned and all of its owners were consenting to its exploitation 
and pollution, others who value it as an ethical good will want to make market transac-
tions which do not contribute to this. They will want to decrease their consumption of 
goods which damage its valuable biodiversity even if its current owners are allowing it 
to be damaged. However, the lack of clear feedback signals means these individuals 
will require large amounts of explicit knowledge to do this. This problem is also dis-
tinct from issues surrounding the international/global nature of certain goods and prob-
lems. Although many who value the Amazon as an ethical good will live in other 
countries, this is not necessary for there to be a lack of feedback information. There 
may be many environmental goods in the same country as you, which you never the 
less receive very little feedback from. The problem of low feedback goods is, therefore, 
a distinct problem for markets.6
Alone, however, the example of the Amazon underestimates the problem of low feed-
back goods. Individuals will value many low feedback goods rather than just one. 
Environmentally minded individuals, for instance, will normally value many ethical envi-
ronmental goods. In large complex societies, the market decisions of individuals will 
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affect many environmental goods which they are greatly separated from but which they 
still value. Individuals with environmental values will, therefore, require large amounts 
of explicit knowledge about the relationship between the production and consumption of 
the different products they buy and a host of environmental goods from which they will 
not receive feedback signals. Again this does not mean that there are no market actors 
who do receive feedback information about environmental goods. Those who live or 
work with an environmental good may receive feedback information, and if only their 
values were at stake, then markets could account for them. The problem, however, is that 
many people who value these goods will not receive such feedback and will require large 
amounts of explicit knowledge. Managing low feedback goods through the market leaves 
most, although not all, unable to act on their values without being aware of a large amount 
of explicit knowledge.
The significance of the low feedback problem is again increased when we move to 
consider other ethical goods. Consider, for instance, individuals who value the good of 
fair labour practices, such as working conditions or wage levels. These actors will aim to 
buy products which are produced by certain labour standards and not with others. 
However, in large societies, market actors are often greatly separated from the production 
of the good they consume and will, therefore, not be given feedback information about 
the effect of their decisions. As a result, they will require a large amount of explicit 
knowledge about the production of all the different products they buy and the resources 
which go into them. Again, there will be examples where market actors will receive feed-
back information about ethical goods, and some goods can be low feedback for certain 
individuals and not others. However, given the size of modern societies, people will often 
be very disconnected from many ethical goods they value. Goods such as fair labour 
practices, fair trade practices, human rights, animal welfare, wealth/resource distributions 
and environmental goods will often be greatly disconnected from the individuals who 
value them. They will, therefore, face large and significant burdens for explicit knowl-
edge when attempting to pursue such goods.
Markets and Explicit Knowledge
Importantly, the burden of explicit knowledge which low feedback goods create necessar-
ily cannot be dealt with by price signals. For Hayekians, price signals are the key com-
municative mechanism in markets. However, they provide only an implicit form of 
communication and do not communicate knowledge so that others become explicitly 
aware of that information. Instead, they allow people to adjust their actions without the 
need for such knowledge. If there are changes in the price of tin, market actors do not 
learn the reason behind those changes but instead adjust their consumption of tin without 
such information (Hayek, 1948). For this reason, Steven Horwitz (2004: 314) refers to the 
price mechanism as a ‘knowledge surrogate’ rather than a mechanism for full communi-
cation. Prices do not allow people to ‘know what other people know’ but rather allow 
people ‘to act as if we knew what others knew’. This means that price signals differ from 
explicit forms of communication, such as speech, which allow people to become explic-
itly aware of knowledge. The price mechanism is an implicit, rather than explicit, form of 
communication and therefore cannot deal with burdens of explicit knowledge.
Market advocates may, however, argue that an alternative form of market communica-
tion can deal with these burdens. Markets present firms with clear incentives to provide 
explicit knowledge to consumers. If, for instance, a firm produces a product which is 
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environmentally friendly, they will have the incentive to signal this, through such things 
as labelling, advertising or branding, in order to gain the custom of those with environ-
mental values. The same incentive will be present for firms producing products with posi-
tive health effects or with high labour standards. Although price signals cannot 
communicate explicit knowledge, firms have the incentive to provide this information to 
individual consumers.
There are significant limitations to communication through such things as product 
labelling which will be considered later. For now, however, this reply can be seen to face 
a more immediate problem. Although firms may have incentives to provide positive 
information about their products, they also face significant incentives to withhold nega-
tive information. If their products have negative environmental or health effects, for 
instance, they will have every incentive to conceal information about such effects from 
consumers who may take this as a reason not to buy them. The incentives facing firms 
can, in fact, lead to the concealment of important information from individuals pursuing 
low feedback goods. Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway (2010), for instance, have docu-
mented how tobacco companies and those linked to the production of acid rain and car-
doon emissions attempted to conceal damaging scientific information from their 
consumers and even actively aimed to spread doubt and misinformation. Even consider-
ing only positive information, firms will still face incentives to present this information in 
certain ways. They will, for instance, have an incentive to adopt a permissive definition 
of terms such as ‘environmentally sustainable’ or ‘good labour practices’ in order to pre-
sent a most positive image of their products. There can be significant communication 
problems produced by the different definitions firms and consumers attach to certain 
terms, particularly when firms have incentives to adopt some definitions over others. 
What a consumer takes the term ‘fair trade’ or ‘free range’ to mean may, therefore, differ 
greatly from the producer.
Problems of concealment or misinformation also cannot be effectively checked by 
consumers when it comes to low feedback goods. If a company conceals the fact that their 
car is uncomfortable, then the consumer can quickly find this out through feedback sig-
nals. If, however, the good in question is a low feedback good, then consumers will often 
not be provided with the information they need to check firms’ claims.
Knowledge in Deliberative Democracy
We have seen that market actors will face significant burdens for explicit knowledge when 
it comes to low feedback goods, and that market communication cannot deal with these 
burdens. There is, therefore, a broad class of goods, including important ethical goods, 
which the epistemic case for markets cannot deal with. Market advocates may still respond 
that markets do not face any greater problems in relation to these goods than democratic 
institutions.7 The rest of this article will, therefore, aim to show that democratic institu-
tions, conceived in deliberative terms, are better able to deal with burdens for explicit 
knowledge and low feedback goods. Importantly, it does not need to show that democracy 
can deal with all low feedback goods or get hold of all explicit knowledge. Rather it needs 
to be established that democracy is better able to do this relative to markets.
Deliberative democracy at first seems well placed to deal with explicit knowledge. 
Such a conception of democracy bases decision-making on a free and open discussion 
among participants. It is a ‘talk centric’ account of democracy which focuses on the giv-
ing of rational arguments in a forum, such as a parliament or assembly (Chamber, 2003). 
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Deliberative democracy, therefore, is based on the explicit communication of speech 
which can, unlike price signals, communicate explicit knowledge. Such an approach, 
however, faces an immediate problem. As Hayekians have argued, the knowledge rele-
vant to addressing social problems includes local knowledge which is fragmented and 
dispersed throughout society. So although deliberative forums are based on explicit com-
munication, this does not establish how such forums can obtain dispersed knowledge, to 
begin with. As we have seen, decentralising democratic forums can reduce this problem 
but cannot solve it. Deliberative democracy must, therefore, be able to overcome the divi-
sion of knowledge in society.
Although deliberative theorists have not addressed this Hayekian problem directly, 
steps towards overcoming it can be found in recent deliberative theory and particularly 
in its systemic turn (Dryzek, 2016; Mansbridge et al., 2012; Parkinson, 2006). The sys-
temic approach has expanded deliberative democracy away from deliberation within the 
forum to deliberation within a wider system and has been influential in areas such as 
environmental democracy (Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014). 
Through this systemic approach, we can start to see how the division of knowledge may 
be addressed by deliberative democracy.
A deliberative system ‘encompasses a talk-based approach to political conflict and 
problem-solving’ (Mansbridge et al., 2012: 4–5). It is, therefore, based on the explicit 
communication of speech. The fact that it is a ‘system’, however, means that speech is 
not confined to empowered decision-making forums and also takes place in a number 
of ‘differentiated yet linked components’ in ‘public space’ (Stevenson and Dryzek, 
2014: 27). These components include universities, trade unions, think tanks, social 
movements, businesses, voluntary associations, newspapers, television, non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) and charities. Although differentiated, discussion and 
talk within each of these components are connected and integrated into the wider sys-
tem so each can ‘consider reasons and proposals generated in other parts’ (Mansbridge 
et al., 2012: 23). Importantly, there are ‘transmissions’ between deliberation within 
‘public space’ and deliberation within the ‘empowered spaces’ of more formal deci-
sion-making institutions (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014: 27–29). Through campaigns 
and lobbying, for instance, discussions in NGOs or think tanks can come to influence 
the final decisions of parliaments.
Part of the reason for the systemic turn is the epistemic benefits which can be discov-
ered by considering the wider system (Christiano, 2012; Mansbridge et al., 2012). 
Important to the system model developed here, is that the different components within 
public space can gather and aggregate different forms of dispersed knowledge, which can 
then be communicated to empowered democratic forums. Consider, for instance, the con-
nection between the scientific deliberations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change and international negotiations on emission reductions. The former providing 
detailed scientific knowledge which is utilised by the later empowered space. Alternatively, 
campaign groups and social movements can be seen to gather knowledge on the local 
effects of social problems which can then influence decision within empowered spaces. 
Hayekians have focused on the problem of centralising dispersed knowledge in the forum. 
However, on a systems approach, democratic forums are not isolated islands of decision-
making but are rather connected to many components within a wider system. These com-
ponents, such as scientific bodies, campaign groups and academic groups, gather and 
aggregate different forms of knowledge which are dispersed throughout the system and 
then aim to communicate this information to democratic forums. As we have already 
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seen, decentralisation can help to reduce the problems highlighted by market advocates, 
so we can also imagine that the empowered space of an effective deliberative system will 
involve a number of decision-making forums. This epistemic model of a democratic 
deliberative system is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the movement of knowledge 
through the system. This model helps us to see how deliberative democracy can start to 
overcome the problem of the division of knowledge.
As it currently stands, however, deliberative systems run up against a significant prob-
lem in relation to the market. What needs to be shown is that a democratic deliberative 
system is better able to gather explicit knowledge than markets. However, the different 
knowledge gathering components of a deliberative system can communicate explicit 
knowledge to individual market actors as well as democratic forums. As Mansbridge et 
al. (2012: 7–8) point out, there can be deliberative systems which are not democratic. We 
can, therefore, conceive of a market-based deliberative system where final decisions are 
not taken by democratic forums, as in a democratic deliberative system, but by individual 
market actors (Figure 2). Within such a system, institutions within public space would 
aim to communicate their explicit knowledge to market actors rather than democratic 
forums. For instance, many environmental groups make information campaigns aimed 
directly at consumers, attempting to provide them with information about the effect of 
their market transactions on valued environmental goods. Similarly, many health charities 
attempt to communicate the conclusions of scientific research to market actors, in order 
that they can make more informed consumer choices.8
We can imagine then two alternative deliberative systems which we can call a demo-
cratic system and a market system. Both deliberative systems involve interconnected 
deliberations within public space which gather and aggregate different forms of knowl-
edge. However, in a democratic system, final decisions are taken in a number of demo-
cratic forums, while in a market system, final decisions are taken by a much greater 
number of individual market actors. As it stands then, deliberative systems can be used to 
support either democracy or markets. In the next section, these alternative deliberative 
systems will be compared, and it will be argued that a democratic system has a number of 
significant advantages when it comes to communicating and utilising the explicit knowl-
edge required for low feedback goods.
Figure 1. Deliberative Democratic System.
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Democratic Systems Versus Market Systems
The first advantage of a democratic system is that it reduces the number and distribution 
of decision-makers to whom explicit knowledge needs to be communicated. In a market 
system, decision-making is decentralised to the level of the individual, while in a demo-
cratic system, decision-making takes place in a smaller number of democratic forums. In 
a market system then, relevant explicit knowledge needs to be communicated to a very 
large number of highly dispersed market actors, while in a democratic system, it needs to 
be communicated to far fewer decision-makers contained within a smaller number of 
forums. The challenges involved in communicating explicit knowledge are, therefore, 
dramatically increased in a market system.
These challenges will differ depending on the form of knowledge. Consider general 
scientific knowledge. Many low feedback goods will require scientific knowledge. 
Knowledge concerning environmental goods and human health, for instance, involves a 
significant scientific component. Scientific knowledge is general knowledge that is often 
available only to those with significant training. It is then, unlike local knowledge, cen-
tralised in the scientific community or academy. As O’Neill (2012) has argued, this means 
that communication of scientific knowledge in markets will face the opposite epistemic 
problems to those identified by Hayekians in centralising local knowledge to a demo-
cratic institution. Instead of centralising dispersed knowledge, a market system will have 
to communicate centralised general knowledge to a large number of highly dispersed 
individuals. The greater the number of decision-makers, the greater the difficulty there 
will be in communicating centralised scientific knowledge to all relevant parties. A demo-
cratic system, therefore, reduces these problems as knowledge needs to be communicated 
to a smaller number of democratic forums. A democratic system reduces the number and 
distribution of decision-makers relative to a market system, which decreases the chal-
lenges of explicitly communicating scientific knowledge.
Burdens for explicit knowledge also include local forms of knowledge. The ways in 
which a production process affects particular people or ecosystems, for instance, may 
only be known to certain on-the-spot individuals who have experience of these effects. A 
market system would, therefore, need to explicitly communicate a large amount of local 
Figure 2. Market Deliberative System.
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knowledge dispersed through society to an equally large number of individuals dispersed 
throughout the market. Local knowledge must be communicated to a vast number of 
decision-making nodes spread throughout the economy. Alternatively, a democratic sys-
tem will again greatly reduce the problem of communicating knowledge, as it signifi-
cantly reduces both the number and distribution of decision-makers relative to a market 
system. In a democratic system, local knowledge needs to be communicated to a much 
smaller number of decision-making forums. A democratic system, therefore, reduces the 
challenges of explicit communication relative to markets, for both scientific and local 
knowledge.
The second advantage of a democratic system is that it reduces the epistemic and cog-
nitive burden placed on decision-makers. Individual market actors will engage in a very 
large number of market decisions which will affect the low feedback goods they value. 
They will, therefore, require explicit knowledge relevant to each of these decisions. 
Consider, for instance, individuals who value low feedback environmental goods. These 
individuals will need to be aware of the environmental impact of all the products they 
buy. This simply places an unreasonable epistemic and cognitive burden on individuals, 
as almost every market transaction will confront them with a sizeable requirement for 
both local and scientific knowledge. It also helps us to see why market advocates cannot 
claim that individuals can merely seek out the information they need. Such a reply fails to 
recognise the size of the epistemic burden facing individuals. An environmentally minded 
consumer, for instance, would have to search out information about nearly all their mar-
ket transactions to determine their effect on low feedback environmental goods. The 
reverse of Oscar Wild’s quip that socialism would take up too many evenings with meet-
ings is that free-markets would take up too many evenings with research.
Alternatively, a democratic system does not require that individuals possess such large 
amounts of information as there is a division of epistemic labour. The transmission of 
knowledge to democratic forums can be undertaken by different components within pub-
lic space which each focuses on particular kinds of knowledge. This knowledge can then 
be communicated to more specialist democratic forums. Unlike market actors who will 
make decisions in relation to a large number of low feedback goods, a democratic forum 
may be tasked with providing a particular good or range of goods. They do not, therefore, 
place such large epistemic and cognitive burdens on individual decision-makers. Forums 
may still require information about how the good they aim to provide affects others. Too 
analytic an approach can miss important ways in which the resolution of one problem can 
affect another. However, the burden is significantly reduced relative to a market system 
which leaves decision-making to individuals.
The third advantage of a democratic system is that it can increase the quality of 
explicit communication. The vast number of decision-makers in markets means that 
information must be greatly simplified in order that it can reach large numbers of peo-
ple. The information which is relevant to low feedback goods is often highly technical, 
such as scientific information, and difficult to understand. It can often also involve 
uncertainties, say about the effects of substances on health, which are not easily quan-
tifiable and can be difficult to apply (Slovic, 2000). This means that the simplification 
of such information can be highly problematic and lead to large reductions in its qual-
ity. Consider, for instance, product labelling as a method to spread health or environ-
mental information to consumers. Communicating information in this way necessarily 
requires significant simplification: first, so that it can fit on a single label, and second 
so it can be easily and quickly understood by consumers. Now compare this to the 
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communication of knowledge within a democratic forum. Knowledge can be explained 
and communicated at length to decision-makers and in a way which recognises its 
complexity. Take deliberative institutions such as citizens’ assemblies. These 
approaches allow citizens to come into direct contact with experts through structured 
events such as expert panels and workshops. A deliberative project on kidney dona-
tion, for instance, held a ‘specialist fair’ where participants were able to approach any 
specialist they wished in order to ask further questions and have information further 
explained (Burgess et al., 2007). These features of democratic forums can allow for a 
greater quality of explicit communication compared to a market system. Of course, 
when it comes to very specialist knowledge, some simplification is inevitable for those 
without particular training. However, the need for simplification in a market system is 
significantly greater than in a democratic system which can allow for a more detailed 
and complex understanding of explicit knowledge.
A democratic system has a number of important advantages over a market system 
which increases its ability to overcome the burdens of explicit knowledge produced by 
low feedback goods. It reduces the challenges of communicating explicit knowledge to 
decision-makers, reduces the cognitive and epistemic burden placed on decision-makers 
and increases the quality of explicit communication.9 A democratic system is, therefore, 
better placed, relative to markets, to provide low feedback goods.
Conclusion
This article has argued that there are good epistemic grounds for granting a greater role to 
democratic institutions than their pro-market critics have suggested. Low feedback goods 
represent a broad range of goods, including important ethical goods, which are better 
dealt with by democratic institutions, whether this is through market regulation or direct 
democratic provision. A democratic system, where decisions are taken in forums, is much 
better placed to deal with the burdens of explicit knowledge than a market system, which 
leaves decision-making to individual market actors. There may, of course, be some very 
large burdens for explicit knowledge which even a democratic system may fail to satisfy. 
However, this does not dispute that democratic institutions are generally better placed to 
deal with such burdens relative to markets.
This problem of low feedback goods may, in fact, go further and suggest an epis-
temic priority of democracy over markets. Before we can know if a particular good can 
be provided by markets, we need first to determine whether such a good is valued by 
individuals who are disconnected from it and, therefore, whether it is a low feedback 
good. In other words, we need to determine how a good is valued before we can estab-
lish whether a market can provide it. A prior process, such as democratic deliberation, 
is therefore required in order to discover the public values which exist for certain goods 
before any kind of market can be advocated. Although there is no space to explore this 
claim here, the argument of this article at least suggests that priority needs to be given 
to democracy over the market. A full defence of such a claim, however, is a subject for 
another paper.
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Notes
1. DeCanio mostly discusses the decision of voters in elections. However, his argument focuses on the sin-
gular and exclusive nature of democratic decisions so also applies to forums.
2. If there are high levels of market concentration, such as monopoly or oligopoly, then the number of deci-
sion points might not be higher in markets.
3. DeCanio (2014) allows for the redistributive function of democracy and may, therefore, be consistent 
with certain levels of equality. Pennington (2003), alternatively, defends market inequality on epistemic 
grounds.
4. Such issues can also cause problems for market approaches which rely on tort law to resolve environmen-
tal harms (see Benson, 2018).
5. It may be argued that individuals are less motivated to act on ethical values in markets relative to democ-
racy. Here such motivations are assumed to be equal in order to focus on the epistemic question.
6. Low feedback goods can also be distinguished from demerit goods. Demerit goods are defined as goods 
which have a negative impact on the consumer who buys them. Examples include unhealthy products 
such as alcohol and tobacco. Demerit goods, however, do not necessarily suffer from a lack of feedback as 
people may be aware of these negative impacts when making their decisions. The concept of low feedback 
goods focuses directly on the epistemic problems resulting from a separation between a good and those 
who value it. It also includes ethical goods which are not well accounted for by the concept of demerit 
goods.
7. This appears to be the case for individual voters in elections who will face the same burdens for explicit 
knowledge as individual consumers.
8. Hayekians have themselves pointed to advertising, trade magazines, books and environmental and reli-
gious groups, as forms of explicit communication which can be utilised by markets (Pennington, 2001: 
180). There may be important questions over the relative effectiveness of public space in a system domi-
nated by markets as compared to a democratic system. Sadly, however, there is not space to pursue such 
questions here.
9. Some market advocates may object, in reference to Coasean theory, that if forums do in fact possess 
these advantages, then a process of market competition would itself select for similar institutional 
structures (Pennington, 2011). In the same way that large firms may prosper if they reduce the costs 
of individual bargaining, those institutional forms which reduce the costs of acquiring knowledge can 
also be selected through market competition. I think there are general reasons to be sceptical of the 
capacity of competition to always select for beneficial institutional forms. However, there are specific 
reasons for why this reply cannot be made against the problem of low feedback goods. Selection by 
market competition requires that the benefits of particular institutions can be recognised by individual 
market actors who can then select for them in their market decisions. If larger firms produce better 
quality cars, then individuals can recognise and select for this. The problem of low feedback goods, 
however, is that they are disconnected from individuals and do not provide them with clear informa-
tion. As a result, a particular institution may provide a low feedback good more successfully and yet 
not have this recognised by market actors due to a lack of feedback. Market competition cannot, there-
fore, be relied on to select such an institution.
ORCID iD
Jonathan Benson  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2243-4227
References
Anderson E (2006) The Epistemology of Democracy. Episteme 3 (1–2): 8–22.
Barry J (1999) Rethinking Green Politics. London: SAGE Publishing.
Benson J (2018) Environmental Law & the Limits of Markets. Cambridge Journal of Economics 42 (10): 
215–230.
438 Political Studies 67(2)
Brennan J (2016) Against Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Burgess J, Stirling A, Clark J, et al. (2007) Deliberative Mapping: A Novel Analytic-Deliberative Methodology 
to Support Contested Science-Policy Decisions. Public Understanding of Science 16: 299–322.
Caplan B (2007) The Myth of the Rational Voter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Chamber S (2003) Deliberative Democratic Theory. Annual Review of Political Science 6: 307–326.
Christiano T (2012) Rational Deliberation among Experts and Citizens. In: Parkinson J and Mansbridge J (eds) 
Deliberative Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.27–51.
Cordato R (2004) Toward an Austrian Theory of Environmental Economics. Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics 7 (1): 3–16.
DeCanio S (2014) Democracy, the Market, and the Logic of Social Choice. American Journal of Political 
Science 58 (3): 637–652.
Díaz S, Demissew S, Carabias J, et al. (2015) The IPBES Conceptual Framework – Connecting Nature and 
People. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 14: 1–16.
Dryzek J (2016) The Forum, the System, and the Polity: Three Varieties of Democratic Theory. Political Theory 
45 (5): 610–636.
Dryzek J and Stevenson H (2011) Global Democracy and Earth System Governance. Ecological Economics 
70: 1865–1874.
Estlund DM (2008) Democratic Authority. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fazey I, Fazey JA and Fazey DMA (2005) Learning More Effectively from Experience. Ecology and Society 
10 (2): 1766–1777.
Greenwood D (2007) The Halfway House: Democracy Complexity, and the Limits to Markets in Green Political 
Economy. Environmental Politics 16 (1): 73–91.
Greenwood D (2012) The Challenge of Policy Coordination for Sustainable Sociotechnical Transitions: The 
Case of the Zero-Carbon Homes Agenda in England. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 
30 (1): 162–179.
Greenwood D (2015) In Search of Green Political Economy: Steering Markets, Innovation and the Case of the 
Zero Carbon Homes Agenda in England. Environmental Politics 24 (3): 423–441.
Hayek FA (1948) The Use of Knowledge in Society. In: Hayek FA (ed.) Individualism and Economic Order. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp.77–91.
Hayek FA (2011) The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek FA (2013) Law, Legislation and Liberty. Oxford: Routledge.
Horwitz S (2004) Monetary Calculation and the Unintended Extended Order: The Misesian Microfoundations 
of the Hayekian Great Society. Review of Austrian Economics 17 (4): 307–321.
Landemore H (2013) Democratic Reason. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mansbridge J, Bohman J, Chambers S, et al. (2012) A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy. In: 
Parkinson J and Mansbridge J (eds) Deliberative Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp.1–26.
Meadowcroft J (2004) Deliberative Democracy. In: Durant RF, Fiorino DJ and O’Leary R (eds) Environmental 
Governance Reconsidered. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp.182–217.
O’Neill J (1998) The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics. London: Routledge.
O’Neill J (2012) Austrian Economics and the Limits of Markets. Cambridge Journal of Economics 36: 1073–
1090.
O’Neill J (2017) Life beyond Capital. Guildford: Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity.
Oreskes N and Conway E (2010) Merchants of Doubt. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
Parkinson J (2006) Deliberation in the Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pascual U, Balvanera P, Díaz S, et al. (2017) Valuing Nature’s Contributions to People: The IPBES Approach. 
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 26: 7–16.
Pennington M (2001) Environmental Markets vs. Environmental Deliberation: A Hayekian Critique of Green 
Political Economy. New Political Economy 6 (2): 171–190.
Pennington M (2003) Hayekian Political Economy and the Limits of Deliberative Democracy. Political Studies 
5: 722–739.
Pennington M (2005) Liberty, Markets, and Environmental Values: A Hayekian Defense of Free-Market 
Environmentalism. Independent Review 10 (1): 39–57.
Pennington M (2011) Robust Political Economy. Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Sagoff M (2008) The Economy of the Earth, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shahar D (2017) Hayek’s Legacy for Environmental Political Economy. In: Boettke P, Coyne C and Storr V 
(eds) Interdisciplinary Studies of the Market Order. London: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.87–109.
Benson 439
Slovic P (2000) The Perception of Risk. London: Earthscan.
Smith G (2009) Democratic Innovations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stevenson H and Dryzek J (2014) Democratizing Global Climate Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Zografos C and Howarth RB (2010) Deliberative Ecological Economics for Sustainability Governance. 
Sustainability 2: 3399–3417.
Author Biography
Jonathan Benson is a PhD candidate in Politics at the University of Manchester and is a member of the 
Manchester Centre for Political Theory. His research interests include political and democratic theory, environ-
mental politics and political economy.  
